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3. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CLIMATE ACTION: THE URBAN DIMENSION 
Simultaneously addressing stabilisation of the climate and economic growth has become a 
challenging task for the international policy community. This apparent trade-off has been so far discussed 
in two ways. The first is to measure economic growth in a way that integrates the degradation of 
environmental assets in the calculation of GDP. The second is to take into account the discounted long-
term economic benefits of climate stabilisation, by avoiding extreme future adverse events. Both 
approaches entail significant measurement and valuation problems. However, findings from a regional 
growth model disaggregated at the metropolitan level, presented in this section, show that the trade-off 
between economic growth and climate policy can be actually lower when local dimensions are taken into 
account. Namely, policies to reduce traffic congestion and increase urban density can have a significant 
effect on national GHG emissions levels while allowing the local economy to grow. Also, adaptation and 
mitigation policies can provide important benefits in the form of reduced energy costs, increased local 
energy security and improved urban health. This is particularly important for city and regional 
governments, which can be sensitive to immediate price increases and investment costs in exchange for the 
less-tangible and longer-term benefits of addressing global climate change.  
3.1. Impact of urban policies on global energy demand and carbon emissions 
 A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model has been used to simulate a world economy 
divided into macro-regions in economic interaction with metropolitan OECD areas. More precisely, this 
modelling exercise has been carried out by employing the spatialised version of the IMACLIM-R CGE 
framework (Crassous et al., 2006). IMACLIM-R allows simulating the interactions between changes in 
energy consumption, carbon emissions and economic growth, given a set of policies and other exogenous 
factors (Box 3.1).41 Two types of urban policies are explicitly explored: i) urban densification42; and, ii) 
congestion charges. The results suggest that densification policies would increase people’s propensity to 
use public transport, from 12.9% in the baseline scenario to 14% by 2050 with densification policies. As a 
consequence, the volume of private transport falls across the OECD, implying a decrease in the demand for 
oil. If cities were to become denser, total OECD energy demand would decrease from 2020 on, and would 
reach 0.6% less compared to the baseline (Figure 3.1). This is in line with previous evidence that urban 
form affects individuals’ travel behaviour and consequently global environmental quality (Grazi et al., 
2008). A similar result is obtained if congestion charges only are applied.  
                                                     
41. The baseline scenarios for both the IMACLIM-R and the OECD ENV-Linkages models, were made 
consistent through comparable exogenous assumptions on demographic trends, labour productivity, GDP 
trends (as a proxy for the intensity of economic activity), fossil energy prices, energy intensity of the 
overall economy and carbon tax trajectories. 
42. Densification indicates policies that increase the number of people per square kilometre in a given urban 
area. These include restrictive and enabling policies. The former actively pursue densification through 
policies such as green belts, whereas the latter are those that allow activity to be drawn to the core such as 
public transportation systems or the elimination of distortions in the market such as taxes for 
deconcentration.  
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Box 3.1. A CGE Model of Metropolitan Economies 
The impact on climate change of policies at the metro-regional scale can be modelled using a general equilibrium 
approach that takes into account most of the factors that influence the way in which an economic system works. In 
particular, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models can be used in order to simulate a world economy divided in 
countries and groups of countries, multiple sectors, and production and consumption functions. The approach taken in 
this section involves the use of IMACLIM-R model (Crassous et al., 2006; see Annex A for details). The global CGE 
model employed in this section has been enriched by a metropolitan module representing the metropolitan economies 
and their interactions with the macro-level (GRAZI and Waisman, 2009). This module was calibrated on the OECD 
Metropolitan Database and consistently with the assumptions in the OECD ENV-Linkages model. 
The model is based on the comparison of two scenarios: one without policy changes, the so-called baseline 
scenario (BS), and a climate policy scenario. The comparison of these two scenarios for each period enables 
quantification of the magnitude of the changes. Two particular local policies have been tested to explore possible 
impacts on the economy and on carbon emissions: densification policies and congestion charges. The densification 
policy can be interpreted as an indirect form of intervention whose primary effect is to reduce individuals’ dependence 
on private transport for commuting. Densification is the increase in the number of inhabitants living in a given territorial 
unit, for instance, the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. In analyzing where an economy chooses to locate 
and under what determinants it distributes across available agglomerations, the metropolitan module in the IMACLIM-
R model draws on the new economic geography approach (Krugman, 1991). The static urban agglomeration structure 
is described by three main determinants: locally available active population, labour productivity, and urban density. 
Data are taken from the OECD Metropolitan Database. The long-run mechanism through which firms (and people 
consequently) agglomerate is driven by an agglomeration-specific attractiveness index that encompasses three main 
factors: the rate of capital return, the expected volume of production and the change in absolute number of firms. Firms 
therefore are attracted by cities with higher capital returns (determined by labour productivity), an increase in the size 
of markets (given by the expected volume of production) and the presence of other firms (so that they can establish 
backward and forward linkages). The model also allows for migration of people among regions and cities following 
firms’ investment decisions. Higher-productivity cities will be able to offer higher wages and thus attract workers and 
skills, which completes the agglomeration cycle. Higher wages are assumed to be a compensation for workers as they 
need to cope with the external costs of the agglomeration, namely commuting, housing costs and local pollution. 
Figure 3.1. Energy Demand with a Densification Policy 
Percent difference in total OECD demand (densification vis-à-vis baseline scenario) 
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Note: The line shows the difference between demand of energy once cities are denser and the baseline scenario (or business as 
usual). 
Source: Simulations from IMACLIM-R model based on the OECD Metropolitan Database. 
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Following the implementation of densification and congestion charges, carbon emissions are reduced 
relative to the baseline, following a similar pattern to the one of energy demand from 2020 on (Figure 3.2). 
We consider the introduction of a local tax on the use of private vehicles by individuals for commuting 
purposes. This takes the form of a toll road of the type already implemented in some metro-regions 
(London and Stockholm among others). 43  The toll road tax can be used in second instance to finance 
metro-region densification plans, thereby lowering the cost of densification. 
Figure 3.2. Carbon Emission Reductions with a Densification Policy 
Percent difference in total emission reductions in OECD (densification vis-à-vis baseline scenario) 
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Source: Simulations from IMACLIM-R model based on the OECD Metropolitan Database. 
3.2. Environment and economic growth at the urban scale: from trade-offs to complementarity 
Densification and congestion charges are not the only effective tools to reduce energy demand and 
carbon emissions, however, they are important as they do not have a detrimental effect on long-term 
economic growth.44 In terms of impact on economic growth, the model generates three adjustment phases 
over time. First, an initial minor and short-lived economic expansion exists with both policies in an almost 
the same pattern until 2025, mainly driven by lower fuel prices as demand for oil falls. Second, economic 
growth becomes mildly negative after 2030 (Figure 3.3). As fuel prices fall, people find it less costly to 
drive again and so they increase their demand for oil and prices start to rise again, bringing about a short-
lived economic contraction. Finally, a more important expansion of economic activity – more so under the 
                                                     
43. Such a road toll reduces average rather than marginal commuting costs by car (see Henderson, 1974 for the 
underlying economics of road pricing mechanisms). 
44. Note that, in the IMACLIM-R model, the explicit representation of technologies through reduced forms of 
technology-rich bottom-up sub models allows for an explicit description of agents’ decisions that drive the 
pace and direction of technical change. Moreover, consumption and investment choices in IMACLIM-R 
are driven by agents’ imperfect foresight and explicit inertias on the renewal of equipments and 
technologies. The combination of these two features is the underlying explanation for moderate carbon 
abatement costs in IMACLIM-R’s policy scenarios when compared to those in other general equilibrium 
models.  
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congestion charges scenario – becomes possible around 2038 since the new increase in oil prices tends to 
accelerate technical change and thus spurs innovation and economic growth.  
Figure 3.3. Economic Growth with Local Policies 
Changes in GDP comparing densification and congestion charges vis-a-vis baseline scenario) 
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Note: DS refers to Densification Scenario; BS refers to Baseline Scenario; TS refers to Tax Scenario (in turn refer to the application of 
congestion charges). 
Source: Simulations from IMACLIM-R model based on the OECD Metropolitan Database. 
Underlying these results is the fact that technology-support policies embodied in the IMACLIM-R 
model can reduce and even offset the economic cost of curbing carbon emissions. In this regard, the 
discussion on how to address the climate change problem has mainly focused on the economic impact of 
carbon abatement. The latter has been evaluated at 1 to 3% – depending on the discount rate used – of 
reduction in world GDP (cf. Stern, 2007 and OECD, 2009a). However, the OECD (2009a) acknowledges 
that the perceived trade-off between economic growth and mitigation policies is lower if technology-
support policies are considered: first because technology-support policies may help address innovation 
failures and boost economic growth; second because these policies postpone emission cuts until 
technologies become available and therefore reduce the impact on economic growth (OECD, 2009a).  
In other words, the prospects of economic growth can actually be improved by providing incentives to 
innovation and growth. Emission reduction targets implied by climate policy bring about the need to 
improve processes and change products in a way that allow firms to comply with such regulations. Firms 
are then obliged to invest in improving their processes; many will fail to do so and perhaps be driven out of 
market, but many others may find new ways of doing things and in the long-run such innovation bursts will 
lead to greater economic progress. OECD (2009a) shows that R&D policies and technology adoption 
incentives are better suited than price and command-and-control (CAC) instruments for correcting specific 
innovation and technology diffusion failures that undermine the creation and diffusion of emissions-
reducing technologies. 
Assessed at the regional or local level, policies to reduce carbon emissions are less opposed to 
economic growth than policies designed at the aggregate level. As mentioned previously, cities are major 
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contributors to climate change through energy demand and on-road transportation; thus local authorities 
can play a part in reducing such demand and emissions by inducing changes in the way people live and 
commute in urban areas. Moreover, policy tools at the disposal of cities’ authorities are effective in 
tackling emissions by avoiding costs that are generally assumed at the macro level. Local policies that 
change commuting patterns – and there could be other policies to reduce emissions that are not explored 
with the model, such as building codes – can effectively reduce carbon emissions and, in the long run, 
boost economic growth through innovation. The reason for this lower trade-off at the urban level lies in the 
fact that more complementarities among policies and economic activities can be observed at the local than 
at the aggregate national level. 
To illustrate the combined effect of climate and urban policies, an emission reduction scenario was 
simulated at 450 ppm (IPCC Scenario III, see Box 3.2). 45 In terms of carbon abatement, this scenario 
corresponds roughly to more than a three-fold reduction in world carbon emissions by 2050, compared 
with the baseline (from above 30 to less than 20 GtCO2). Between 2005 and 2050, world GHG emissions 
are reduced by roughly half. In the OECD, the abatement is even bigger in relative terms (Figure 3.4). The 
associated GDP losses could represent up to one-third of a percentage point for the OECD (Table 3.1).  
Box 3.2. Emission Targets and Modelling of Climate Policy 
When carbon emission targets set to avoid serious climate change (e.g. limiting global warming at 2° C) are 
compared with those considered in energy economics literature on mitigation scenarios, substantial discrepancies 
emerge. So far, most model assessments of mitigation costs have considered stabilisation levels of atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations above 500 ppm CO2eq (e.g. Stern (2007) focuses on mitigation scenarios aiming at 
500 to 550 ppm CO2eq). Although such stabilization levels are likely to be insufficient for keeping warming below 2°C 
(Meinshausen et al., 2006), they are used as a benchmark for climate-energy modelling exercises: out of 177 
mitigation scenarios considered in the IPCC AR4, only six were grouped in the lowest stabilization category 
(corresponding to 445–490 ppm CO2eq, which is consistent with a medium likelihood of achieving the 2°C target).  
The rationale behind the limited number of studies considering reduction targets that are consistent with the 2°C 
target is that such low stabilisation can only be attained under a number of restrictive assumptions: i) a high degree of 
flexibility of substitution within the energy economic system; ii) a broad portfolio of technology options (including bio-
energy, other renewables and carbon capture and storage); iii) a full and immediate participation in a global mitigation 
effort; and, iv) the necessity of generating negative emissions. 
 
                                                     
45. Note that a 450 ppm CO2 scenario roughly corresponds to a 530-550 ppm of all GHG scenario. 
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Figure 3.4. Trends in carbon emissions under climate policy compared with the baseline 
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Source: Simulations from the IMACLIM-R model. 
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Table 3.1. GDP changes under implementation of alternative climate policy packages 
OECD 
Discount rate 
Stabilisation target: 450 ppm 
(IPCC scenario III, 2007) 
Stabilisation target: 410 ppm 
(IPCC scenario II, 2007) 
Carbon price  Carbon price + Urban spatial policy Carbon price  
Carbon price + 
Urban spatial policy 
1% -0.05% -0.04% -0.91% -0.85% 
3% -0.16% -0.15% -0.84% -0.67% 
7% -0.34% -0.33% -0.72% -0.37% 
 
World 
Discount rate 
Stabilisation target: 450 ppm 
(IPCC scenario III, 2007) 
Stabilisation target: 410 ppm 
(IPCC scenario II, 2007) 
Carbon price  Carbon price  
1% -0.88% -4.16% 
3% -1.01% -3.62% 
7% -1.15% -2.95% 
Notes:  
For a given discount rate r, GDP losses are actualized starting from 2010, year at which the urban densification policy is expected 
to be set in place;  
Actualized GDP losses are computed by making use of the standard formula: 
2050
2010
2010 (1 )
t
t
t
GDP
r −= +∑  
Note that with high discount rates both, loses and gains, in the long term, yield low discounted values. In a scenario in which loses 
take place at the beginning of the period and gains at the end (such as in Figure 3.3) then the discounted cumulated losses are higher 
the discount rate. 
Source: Calculations based on the IMACLIM-R model. 
 
For the group of OECD countries, it was possible to simulate the joint effects of implementing both a 
carbon price and urban spatial policies. Under the 450 ppm target, the gains from urban policies are 
relatively mild, although positive. If a more demanding target, such as 410 ppm, were to46 be reached, the 
complementarity between the two policies would be sizeable (around 0.3% of OECD GDP, when a strong 
discounting rate is used. The global GDP losses under the 410 ppm climate policy scenario range from 3% 
to greater than 4% of GDP. Although it could not be simulated at this stage by lack of data, it is likely that 
urban policies implemented at a global scale could generate much larger benefits.  
Going beyond the alleviation of carbon abatement costs, there are complementarities between carbon 
emission reductions and economic growth that can be found at the urban level. Using the attractiveness 
                                                     
46. This is the result for the OECD using the highest discount rate (7%) It is the difference between -0.72% 
with carbon prices alone and -0.37% with densification added. 
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index that is the heart of the agglomeration dynamics in the spatialised version of IMACLIM-R model, it 
can be seen that a group of highly attractive metro-regions are associated with high levels of carbon 
emissions stemming from commuting, such as Los Angeles, New York, Seoul, Tokyo or Toronto. In 
contrast, a number of metro-regions combine relatively low emission levels per automobile and high 
attractiveness (e.g. Auckland, Madrid, and Sydney, Figure 3.5). Commuting modes could therefore be at 
the heart of carbon emission patterns, implying that a more intensive use of public transport may contribute 
significantly to reducing GHG emissions.  
 
Figure 3.5. Attractiveness and Carbon Emissions related to Automobiles across Metro-regions 
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Source: Calculations based on the IMACLIM-R model and OECD Metropolitan Database. 
In this context, low pollution levels will increasingly be a factor driving the attractiveness of urban 
areas. In the next two decades, cities that could become more attractive will do so while also curbing local 
pollution. According to the results of the CGE model, and if current trends are sustained, cities that could 
experience improvements in attractiveness by 2030 include Ankara, Auckland, Barcelona, Krakow, Lille, 
Melbourne, Montreal, Monterrey, and Toronto; they will do so while also trimming down local pollution 
(Figure 3.6). Conversely, metro-regions could lose attractiveness if they continue to pollute, as in the cases 
of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Osaka, Paris, Philadelphia, Seoul and Tokyo if current trends 
continue.  
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Figure 3.6. Changes in Attractiveness and Local Pollution Emissions across Metro-regions 
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Source: Calculations based on the IMACLIM-R model and the OECD Metropolitan Database. 
If local pollution is related to attractiveness, and the latter associated to population and firm creation, 
higher incomes, productivity and wages, then an environmental policy at the local level could generate 
economic gains. In particular, changing the urban structure by increasing cities’ density and intensifying 
the use of public transportation may induce both improvements in attractiveness – and therefore economic 
performance – and in cities’ responsiveness to climate change. As will be developed below, densification 
policies to respond to climate change can take the form of removing tax and development disincentives in 
the urban core, actively pursuing compact spatial form, and increasing mass transit networks and urban 
amenities in areas targeted for higher-density growth. These issues should be at the heart of the ongoing 
debate about a green growth strategy. 
3.3. Benefits for non-climate policies 
Additional local benefits resulting from emissions reductions and climate adaptation policies may also 
be partly responsible for a potential positive relationship between economic growth and GHG emissions 
reduction at the metropolitan regional level. These benefits can be grouped into five categories: 
i) Public health improvements 
ii) Cost savings and increased efficiency 
iii) Energy security and infrastructure improvements 
iv) Improved quality of life 
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Each of these categories of benefits represent gains beyond those directly related to reduced GHG 
emissions or protection against climate change impacts. Table 3.2 provides an overview of some of the 
main co-benefits of mitigation policy in urban areas. The non-climate benefits of certain climate change 
policies are strong enough to warrant their implementation regardless of their impact on mitigating or 
adapting to climate change. In these cases they are considered “no-regrets” strategies (Hallegatte et al., 
2008). 
Table 3.2. Related aims and co-benefits of sector policies to reduce GHGs at urban scale 
Sector Climate policy aims and benefits Other (non-climate change) benefits  
Electricity production and industrial 
energy use 
Encourage fuel switching from coal 
and oil to low or no-emission 
energy sources, such as combined 
heat & power, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, to reduce 
CO2 emissions  
Raises urban air quality and limits 
regional SOx and NOx air pollution, 
preserve water quality, increase 
energy security, all of which can 
deliver local benefits 
Residential & commercial energy: 
buildings, office equipment & 
appliances 
Lower energy use requirements of 
housing and household services, 
reduce CO2 emissions 
Lower investment costs for energy 
suppliers and possibly smooth load; 
lower operating costs for 
commercial entities & consumers 
and avoids regional air pollution 
from (unnecessary) electricity 
and/or heat generation; improve 
comfort and affordability; raise 
energy security 
Transport 
Raise the efficiency and emission 
performance of vehicles and 
manage demand, reduce CO2 and 
possibly other GHG emissions 
Lower congestion in cities and limit 
harm to human health from urban 
air pollution; lower dependency on 
oil imports to raise energy security.  
However co-costs may also exist 
e.g. increased diesel fuel use 
lowers CO2 but increases 
particulates, which have human 
health risks; also catalytic 
converters lower NOx emissions but 
raise N2O and CO2 emissions  
Waste 
Minimise waste, increase recycling 
and material efficiency in production 
and packaging, reduce CH4 
emissions 
Limit needs for costly and unsightly 
landfilling; improve economic 
performance 
Source: Hallegatte, Stéphane, Fanny Henriet and Jan Corfee-Morlot (2008), “The economics of climate change impacts and policy 
benefits at city scale: a conceptual framework”, Environment Working Papers No. 4, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Mitigating greenhouse gas emissions provides public health benefits by reducing many dangerous air 
pollutants (OECD, 2008a), making health benefits an important co-benefit of efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions in metropolitan regions. Indeed, reduction in urban air pollution is an important component of 
many national estimates of climate change mitigation co-benefits.47 GHG emissions reductions may benefit 
human health to such a degree as to offset in large part the local costs of emissions reduction (OECD, 
2009b).48  
Policies to reduce GHG emissions through increasing energy efficiency can result in significant 
reductions in energy costs. Initiatives to improve building energy-efficiency are examples of no-regrets 
                                                     
47. Cifuentes (1999), Davis et al. (2000) and Kunzli et al. (2000) as cited in OECD (2009b). 
48. OECD (2001), Davis et al., (2000) and IPCC (2007b) as cited in OECD (2009b). 
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strategies because the energy savings achieved can compensate for the initial investment costs in as little as 
a few years (Hallegate et al., 2008). Policies to reduce the amount of energy already going to waste are 
cost-neutral if their implementation costs are compensated over time.  
Both mitigation and adaptation policies can improve the security of local infrastructure and public 
services. Policies to mitigate greenhouse gases improve national security through reducing dependency on 
foreign energy sources and by reducing the risks involved in transporting highly combustible fossil fuels 
around the world (Schellnhuber et al., 2004). Adaptation measures can also improve the security of an 
area’s energy supply. For example, improving the resilience, efficiency and redundancy of energy supply 
networks protects against interruptions in electricity service during extreme heat events and also reduces 
the risk of shortfalls (peak demand outstripping supply) or intentional attacks on the system. Similarly, 
some infrastructure to protect coastal cities from storm surge and flood risks can be economically justified 
even at current sea levels (Hallegate et al., 2008). 
Many of the measures that mitigate climate change and that help adapt to its effects also make cities 
more liveable and therefore potentially more competitive. For instance, cities that reclaim land in flood 
plains as part of adaptation plans can make this land available to the public as parks or recreational land. 
This provides an amenity to residents, removes buildings and other infrastructure from flood plains, 
reduces the urban heat island effect, helps control downstream flooding, provides habitat for animals, and 
limits water pollution by slowing storm water runoff into large bodies of water. Efforts to reduce personal 
vehicle use and increase use of mass transit can improve public safety and reduce traffic congestion and 
noise (Hallegate et al., 2008). 
Adaptation to climate change and mitigation of climate change can also be complementary strategies. 
Adaptation focuses on expanding the ability to cope with changes in climate, whereas mitigation focuses 
on reducing the amount of change through reducing emissions or removing greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere through sequestration. In choosing a portfolio of mitigation and adaptation measures, it may be 
necessary to make investment trade-offs between them. However, adaptation and mitigation can go hand in 
hand, for example when developing a decentralized energy system based on locally available energy 
sources. Here, GHG emissions may be lower, as may be the vulnerability to large-area outages from severe 
weather impacts.  
Synergies between policies to reduce GHG emissions and adapt to expected climate change impacts 
are particularly important at the urban level. For example, efforts to reduce building energy demand for 
cooling can also reduce urban heat island effects and prevent electricity shortfalls and blackouts during 
extreme heat events. On the local level, adaptation and mitigation policies are deployed through the same 
policy sectors, including land-use planning, transportation, and building sectors, as opposed to the global 
scale, where mitigation and adaptation goals are designed separately. This synergy presents opportunities 
to design urban mitigation and adaptation policies within a consistent framework (Hallegatte et al., 2008). 
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ANNEX A: COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF CITIES AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE (IMACLIM-R AND OECD METROPOLITAN DATABASE) 
A.1 The Model and Methodology 
Approach and capabilities of the model 
Our methodology is based on a model that takes into account patterns in OECD metro-regions and the 
feedback mechanisms that can take place between cities and more aggregate dimensions of the economy. 
Thus, the OECD Metropolitan Database is used to model the behaviour of cities and a general equilibrium 
model that allows for the interaction of such metro-regions and the national macroeconomic activity as 
well as carbon emissions affecting climate change. Understanding those feedback mechanisms is crucial to 
better inform on long-run trends of aggregate indicators of local and global economic development that are 
relevant for policy scenario analysis.  
The model that is developed in this paper will yield information on the spatial and economic 
dimensions of the metro-regions such as: i) the social and economic aspects of the spatial structure of the 
metro-regions; ii) the behaviour of the supply side of the metro-regional economies; iii) the behaviour of 
the demand side of the metro-regional economies. These dimensions of the urban economy will allow 
constructing an indicator of attractiveness for our metro-regions and differences in such attractiveness will 
determine the long-run spatial and economic development patterns of the 78 metro-regions through firms’ 
migration decisions. 
The model proposed in this paper has the capacity to predict the potential impacts of certain policies 
at the metro-region scale on energy consumption, carbon emissions and economic growth.  Our analysis 
aims at comparing the impact of alternative policy measures at the metro-regional level on core economic 
and environmental variables. In terms of policy implications, the lesson emerging from the comparative 
analysis could provide useful information on the extent to which the role played by alternative setting of 
the spatial economy is relevant in combating carbon emissions. The modelling analysis can also be seen as 
a useful base for further studies of OECD metro-regions, since studies combining theoretical modelling 
approach and empirical dynamic computable general equilibrium technique applied to the relationship 
between spatial development of metro-regions, location choices, energy consumption pathways and 
climate change are, to the best of our knowledge, not available. 
The model 
In our model, the world is composed of many macro-regions each of which can be seen as a mass of 
metro-regions. We assume that each metro-region is monocentric and axi-symmetrical that spreads along 
an one-dimensional space [ ];x d d∈ − , where d is the overall city size. Like traditionally approached by 
urban and regional economics since von Thünen (1966), the central business district (CBD), situated at the 
origin 0x = , is the location where firms choose to distribute once they locate in the metro-region. All 
economic activities take place in the j-CBD, whereas the urban population is distributed within circular 
peripheral areas surrounding it. In our economy three types of decision-makers exist: governments, 
producers, and consumers. We assume that the government chooses housing policies that maximise the 
utility of the representative consumer. Profit-maximizing firms do not consume land, while utility-
  163
maximizing workers do. Urban workers settled at a certain point x of d consume λj(x) units of land and 
commute a distance x to the CBD. The number of urban workers Lj is given by: 
0
d
( )j jx d
xL
xλ≤ ≤
= ∫                                                                   (1) 
At the land market equilibrium, workers are indifferent between any x-location around the CBD of 
metro-region j J∈ . This comes down to assuming that all people living inside each peripheral rings at 
each point x face identical external costs resulting from the interplay between different commuting costs 
(being different the distance from each individual’s residential place and the CBD, where jobs and all 
varieties of the differentiated goods are available) and housing costs (being heterogeneous the value and 
the consumption of land throughout the periphery). 
Government owns the available land and decides of the spatial distribution of housing supply. Hence, 
heterogeneity of density within the metro-region does not result from households’ preferences over the 
available land but is rather exogenously set. We take the trend for the density function λj(x) as given and 
choose a power functional form for the sake of simplicity. 
*( ) 0 1,  withj Jx x
ξλ λ ξ= ≤ ≤  103                                                              (2) 
As in Murata and Thisse (2005), each urban worker supplies one unit of labour. Considering unitary 
commuting costs 0jθ ≥  in the iceberg form à la Samuelson (1954),104 the effective labour supply of a 
worker living in the urban area at a distance x from the CBD is: 
( ) 1 2 , withj j j js x x d x dθ= − − ≤ ≤                                                  (3) 
Condition: 
1
2j jd
θ ≤  ensures positive labour supply. The total effective labour supply throughout the 
urban area is therefore: 
( )
1
*
( ) 2 1
d 1 2
( ) 1 2
j j
j j
j j j
j Jd x d
s x d
S x d
x
ξ ξθλ λ ξ ξ
−
− ≤ ≤
−= = −− −
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫
                                (4) 
whereas the total potential labour supply is given by: 
( )
1
*
21
d
( ) 1
j j
j
j
j Jd x d
d
L x
x
ξ
λ λ ξ
−
− ≤ ≤
= = −∫
                                                        (5) 
                                                     
103. Condition 0ξ ≥ ensures that ( )j xλ is an increasing function, so that the empirical evidence of higher 
population density in the centre of the city is captured. Condition 1ξ ≤ is necessary to have population 
convergence in (1). 
104. Considering different unitary commuting costs j
θ
across the agglomerations captures the specificities of 
each agglomeration in terms of modal shares and transport infrastructures. 
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Letting wj be the wage rate firms pay to workers to carry out their activity within the j-urban area, 
commuting costs CCj faced by one worker in the metro-region j result from the losses of effective labour. 
Combining (4) and (5), we obtain: 
( )
( )*
2 1
1 2
j j j
j j j
j j
L S w
CC d
L
ξ θλ ξ ξ
− −= = − −                                                 (6) 
We normalize at zero the rent value of the land located at the edges of the city: Rj(dj) = 0. Given that 
all urban workers are identical from a welfare perspective, using (3) the value of commuting costs 
2 j xθ and rent costs Rj(x) is the same throughout the urban city. Precisely: 
( )2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0 1 2j j j j j j j j j j j j j jd w x R x s d w s d w d wθ λ θ+ = + = − + = −             (7) 
From (7), the equilibrium land rent is simply derived, as follows: 
( )2
( )
( )
j j
j j
j
d x
R x w
x
θ
λ
−=
                                                                     (8) 
In order to understand how the land rent is distributed among urban workers by the local government, 
we first calculate the aggregated land cost by integrating Rj(x) over distance x that represents the available 
urban land, and then divide the resulting figure by the labour force that is active in the city: 
1( ) ( ) d
( ) 1( ) 2
2
j j
j j
jd x d
j j j
j
x R x x
x
RC x w
L
λ λ
θ ξ
− ≤ ≤= = −
∫
                                  (9) 
Combining (6) and (9) gives 1j
j
CC
RC
ξ= −  which determines the distribution of external costs over 
commuting and housing: the lower ξ, the more commuting costs are relatively important. From each 
labourer’s income, an amount: CCj +RCj = ECLj is deduced as compensation to live in the urban area. This 
amount is expected to affect consumers’ purchasing power jϒ .  
Consumption 
We consider a macro-regional economy comprised by a mass of metro-regions (labeled j = (1; J)), 
two sectors, one composite sector D of the Imaclim-R manufacturing-plus-service type taking place in a j-
metro-regional agglomeration, and one traditional sector F  that is active in the non-metro-regional land. 
We assume that the many firms of the manufacturing-plus-service type produce each one variety (labeled i 
= (1; N)) of one type of the differentiated good q under increasing returns to scale. Therefore, the number 
of available varieties in each metro-region j, jn N∈ , is equal to the number of firms that are active in the 
same metro-region. The traditional good is produced produces under Walrasian conditions (constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition) and can be freely traded across metro-regions. At any time, by 
assuming the well-known iceberg structure for transport costs (Samuelson, 1952), any variety of the 
composite good can be traded between the two regions. Transportation costs are zero for intraregional 
shipment of both goods. We extend the standard NEG literature (Krugman, 1991) by tracking bilateral 
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flows for the mass of metro-regional agglomerations, so that a quantity cjk(i) of a variety produced in 
metro-region j is consumed in k and purchased at a price pjk. We define a price index Pj of the composite 
good available in j in order to be able to treat the various products as a single group. 
1
1
1
1
1
1
( ) d ( ) d d
j kn
j jj
i
n
kj
k j i
P p i i p i i k
ε
ε ε
−
−
=
−
≠ =
= +
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫                                               (10) 
Here 1ε >  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The economy employs a unit mass of 
mobile workers L: wherever they are employed. Workers (L) are both input production factors and output 
end-users. Given a certain net income jϒ , individuals should decide allocating over the consumption of 
the above described differentiated good D (produced in the metro-regions), and a ‘traditional’ good F 
(freely traded and purchased at a homogenous price pF). We consider households that reach identical 
welfare levels and bare identical external costs ECLj stemming from being located in the j- metro-region 
(see eq. (7)). Given individual’s utility Uj defined over the disposable income jϒ for consumption in each j, 
welfare maximization behaviour imposes: 
max ( ), ( )j j j j j jU U D F= ϒ ϒ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦                                                      (11) 
For the sake of simplicity, we choose a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the utility function: 
( ) ( ) ( )1j j j jU D F Zβ β ζ− −=                                                    (12) 
where, j j j j j jZ k Q k n q= = captures the negative environmental externalities associated to production Qj via 
a j-specific coefficient k. The intensity of the environmental burden is measured by the parameter ζ. Price 
and utility homogeneity throughout the j-metro-region impose that aggregate consumption of the 
composite good is independent on the distance x from the j-core. The constant-across-metro-region sub-
utility from aggregate consumption of all the varieties composing the manufacturing good is: 
11
1
1
1
( ) d ( ) d d
j kn
j jj
i
n
kj
k j i
D c i i c i i k
ε
εε
ε
ε
ε
−−
=
−
≠ =
= +
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫                                    (13) 
The representative consumer has to satisfy the following budget constraint: 
1 1
d( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d
j kn n
jj jj jkj kj
i k j i
kp i c i di p i c i i
= ≠ =
+ = ϒ∫ ∫ ∫
                                 (14) 
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where jϒ is the net disposable income for consumption, already discounted from external costs for 
workers ECLj (see eq. (7)). Maximizing utility given in (12) subject to (14) gives the aggregate demand in 
metro-region j for the variety i produced in metro-region k 
( )
( )1( )
kj
kj j j
j
p
c i L
P
ε
ε
−
−= ϒ
                                                                (15) 
Production  
All firms producing in a given metro-region j incur the same production costs and rely upon capital 
and labour as the same spatially mobile input factors. We consider labour as subject to external economies 
of scale resulting from improved production process through some metro-region-specific technology 
spillover, as follows: 
,0j
j
j
l
l
n α
=
                                                                    (16) 
where lj is the effective unitary labour input requirement for production, nj is the given number of active 
firms in region j, α is a parameter that captures the non linearity of the external agglomeration effect (Fujita 
and Thisse, 1996; Grazi et al., 2007), and lj,0 is the agglomeration-specific unitary labour input requirement 
for production in absence of agglomeration effects (α = 0) 
Due to the fixed input requirement, the amount of productive capital in metro-region j, Xj is 
proportional to the number of domestic firms, nj : 
j jX nχ=                                                                (17) 
Firms of the above type find it profitable to join a certain metro-region j to benefit from a specialised 
labour market. This brings about differences in terms of labour productivity between producing inside and 
outside the metro-region. To avoid all firms concentrating in the same place because of absent specific 
differentiation, we introduce inherent reasons for differential location choices. We therefore assume that 
firms choose to locate according to the trade-off between production benefits and costs that are specific of 
the metro-region j. Concerning the former, they take the form of heterogeneous labour productivity across 
different metro-regions (that is j Kl l≠ ), whereas the latter are indirectly captured by the different labour 
costs (namely, the wage rate wj) firms face across the different metro-regions to compensate workers for 
the metro-region-specific external costs. Letting rj and wj the unitary returns of, respectively, capital Xj and 
labour lj, the total cost of producing qj for a firm ∈ ji n  in region j is expressed as: 
( ) ( )χ= +j j j jTC i r l w q i                                                           (18) 
Given its monopoly power, it is clear that each firm acts to maximise profit: 
( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j j ji p q i r l w q iπ χ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦                                                    (19) 
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In order to allow the model for the spatial dimension, trade is allowed between the metro-regions. We 
use the iceberg form of transport costs associated with trade of the composite goods (Samuelson, 1952). In 
particular, if one variety i of manufactured goods is shipped from metro-region j to metro-region k, only a 
fraction will arrive at the destination, the remainder will melt during shipment. This means that if a variety 
produced in location j is sold in the same metro-region at price pjj, then it will be charged in consumption 
location k at a price 
pjk = Tjk pjj                                                                          (20) 
where Tjk > 1 captures the trade cost from metro-region j to metro-region k. 
As already mentioned, the freely tradable traditional good F is produced under constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition. Letting rF and wF the unitary returns of, respectively, capital XF and labour lF, 
the total cost of producing qF for a firm settled outside the metro-regional area is expressed as follows: 
[ ]F F F F F FTC r X l w q= +                                                           (21) 
In such a perfectly competitive market, the price of the traditional good is obtained directly from 
marginal production costs: 
F F F F Fp r X l w= +                                                           (22) 
Short-run market equilibrium  
Given nj firms operating in the metro-region j, the labour-market equilibrium condition posits that the 
total labour effectively supplied Sj (see eq. (4)) is equal to the total labour requirements by production ljnjqj: 
  
11 2
2j j j j j j j
S L d l n qξ θξ
⎡ ⎤−= − =⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦                                                    (23) 
where, we recall, dj is the size of metro-region j, θj is the unitary commuting cost in metro-region j and njqj 
is the total domestic production of the composite good. 
Moreover, market clearing condition imposes that all that is produced by firms is also consumed by 
individuals. Hence, production size qj(i) of a firm located in region j is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )dj jj jk jk
k j
q i c i T c i k
≠
= + ∫
                                                        (24) 
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality we consider that all the varieties are identical. 
This allows us to drop the notation i for the variety in the reminding of the analysis. In particular, the price 
index in (10) can be re-written as: ( )
1
1
11 dj j j k kj k
k j
P n p n T p k
ε
εε
−
−−
≠
= +
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
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By plugging (15) into (24), we obtain the equilibrium production of one firm operating in metro-region j. 
( )
( )
( )
( )1 1 d
j jk k
j j j jk k k
kj k j
p T p
q L T L k
PP
ε ε
ε ε
− −
− −
≠
= ϒ + ϒ∫
                                        (25) 
As a consequence of the profit maximization behaviour, firms will enter and exit the manufacturing 
sector until the point at which profits are zero, as an equilibrium condition of monopolistic competition. 
Therefore, by substituting (25) into (19) and setting 0jπ = , the return to capital rj at equilibrium is 
straightforwardly obtained: 
( )j j j j
j
p l w q
r χ
−=
                                                         (26) 
Recalling that pj is the price of a variety i that is both produced and sold in metro-region j, under 
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic market we have that a profit-maximizing firm sets its price as a constant mark-
up on variable cost by assuming a constant elasticity of substitution (CES), ε > 1: 
1 1
j j j
j
j j
TC l w
p
q n α
ε ε
ε ε
∂= =− ∂ −                                                             (27) 
All varieties are sold in the metro-region at the same price and no trade costs occurs to spatially 
differentiate the market value of a given variety. It is now worth spending a few words in order to make 
clear what we consider as the wage rate wj. In our spatial economy, a fraction of the whole available land 
hosts metro-regional activities. The equilibrium on workers’ migration imposes that the utility level per 
unit of labour reached by living within the j-metro-regional area is identical to the one achieved within the 
k-one. This is because certain beneficial effects are expected to be homogeneously faced by individuals as 
they decide to enter the metro-regional market.  
Workers will chose to enter the metro-regional market if the utility they reach in there is at least equal 
to level of (unitary, per unit of work) utility in the outside area, u*. 
( ) ( ) ( )1 *j j j j j
j j j
D F n q
u
l n q
β β δκ− − =
                                                 (28) 
Our model allows for income distributional effects and assumes that all revenues produced in metro-
region j are redistributed locally. In other words, the aggregate revenue in metro-region j, j jL ϒ equals the 
sum of total wages ljwjnjqj and return to capital rjXj:   j j j j j j j jL l w n q r Xϒ = + .105 
                                                     
105. Note that implicitly, this expression means that the housing rents are also redistributed across households, 
as they do not appear in the income formation. 
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Utility maximization under the Cobb-Douglas specification in (1) leads to the following identities 
between prices and quantities for the two market goods: j j jP D β= ϒ and ( )1F j jp F β= − ϒ . Substituting the 
two identities into (28) gives the equilibrium wage rate for a worker in metro-region j: 
( )( )
( ) ( )1* 111j j F j j jw u P p n q
δββ
ββ
ε κεβ β
−
−
−= −                          (29) 
The long-run model 
This section extends the short-run model so as to address dynamics and ensure analytical consistency 
for its inclusion in the Imaclim-R framework as a specific module accounting for the spatial organization 
of the economy at the urban scale. Dynamics in our modeling framework is carried out in two steps. 
Spatial disaggregation  
We consider the Imaclim-R static equilibrium at time t. At this time, macroeconomic information at 
the macro-regional and national levels are disaggregated into a combination of local urban economies 
where the interactions between economic agents occur in the form developed in the previous sub-sections. 
In each metro-region j at time t, a fixed number of profit-maximizing firms nj(t) sets prices pj(t) and 
quantities qj(t) to meet households’ demand for the composite good D, according to (25) and (27). Labour 
requirement for production drives population distribution Lj(t) and metro-region size dj(t) through relations 
(23) and (5), respectively. Consistency between descriptions of the economy at the metro-regional and 
macro-regional or national scales requires ensuring that the average value of each spatially disaggregated 
(i.e., metro-regional) variable equals the value of the corresponding aggregate (macro-regional) variable 
resulting from the Imaclim-R equilibrium.  
 
Firm mobility  
The second step of the module describes firms’ location decisions and induced changes in the spatial 
distribution of firms and productive capital in the national economy. Metro-regions differ in labour and 
infrastructure endowment, captured by labour productivity lj and unitary commuting costs θj, respectively. 
These j-specificities act as constraints on production expectations (through (18)) and expected capital 
returns (through (26)), and hence influence the attractiveness of metro-regions for productive investment. 
The attractiveness of metro-regions ultimately affects the migration decisions of firms. 
Location decisions across the set of available metro-regions at time t are taken by firms on the basis of 
an index of relative attractiveness aj(t) that accounts for the capital return investors expect to receive from 
investing in a given metro-regional market. This reflects the active role of shareholders who want to 
maximise the return to capital, which is a priori a cost to firms. The relative attractiveness aj(t) helps 
determine the stable spatial distribution of firms across the available metro-regions at equilibrium time t + 
1, nj(t + 1).  
Two types of firms base their location decisions on aj(t): the existing firms at previous equilibrium 
time, and the newly created firms. For each of the two groups of firms we are able to establish the stable 
number of firms at a given equilibrium time. 
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(i) First, consider the case of two metro-regions labeled j and k, with j, k = (1; 2); j ≠ k. For a generic 
old j-firm (that is a firm coming from previous equilibrium time and settled in metro-region j), 
the magnitude of the incentive to migrate to a k depends on the relative attractiveness of metro-
region j: 
2 3
1 1 1( ) ( )
( ) ( )j k k j jk k j
m a t a t
l t l t
γ γ
γ
δ→
⎛ ⎞= ± − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠                                   (30) 
were δjk is the distance between the metro-regions j and k, lk(t) measures the  productivity of labour in 
metro-region k , and γ1, γ2, γ3 (such that γ1, γ2, γ3 > 0 and γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1) represent the measurement of the 
relative migration incentive of, respectively, attractiveness, distance, and labour productivity.  
Equation (30) writes that a generic j-firm is encouraged to move to k from metro-region j if condition: ak(t) 
- aj(t) > 0 is verified (as this ensures 
0j km → > ). The magnitude of this incentive is a function of: a) the 
difference in relative attractiveness between metro-regions; b) the physical distance δjk between them; and 
c) the absolute difference between metro-regions in the structure of production, as captured by the labour 
productivity term ( ) ( )k jl t l t− . Extending (30) to entail a more generic frame, in which many alternative 
metro-regions are spatially available, the incentive to move to an metro-region j from any other k (with j, k 
= (1; J) and j ≠ k) is derived as follows: 
dMj j k
k j
M m kμ →
≠
= ∫
                                                    (31) 
where μM is a parameter that homogenizes the units of measurement. 
(ii) Consider now the case of new firms that are created at the equilibrium time t. They spatially sort 
out themselves across the J metro-regions according to the value of relative metro-regional 
attractiveness. The number of firms created in metro-region j is proportional to the emerging 
force Ej: 
( ) ( )Ej jE t a tμ=                                                                       (32) 
where μE is a parameter that homogenizes the units of measurement. Given the economy size at the time t, 
the total number of firms in metro-region j at the equilibrium time t + 1 results from the interplay between 
firms’ migration decisions from other metro-regions and entry of new firms: 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j jn t n t M t E t+ = + +                                                   (33) 
The absolute attractiveness Aj(t) of a j-metro-region is given by the absolute variation of firms between to 
consecutive equilibria, ( 1) ( )j jn t n t+ − , so that: 
( ) ( ) ( )j j jA t M t E t= +                                                             (34) 
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A. 2 Main results of the model with a climate policy only 
As section 3 aims at evaluating possible impacts of local policies, it is important to bear in mind the 
impacts that a carbon policy alone might entail without the urban module in the IMACLIM-R model. The 
results in terms of cost effects of implementing a single carbon tax can be expressed as the ratio of GDP 
under the carbon tax compared to the baseline scenario (no carbon tax). In the first 20 years of the carbon 
tax implementation period the OECD economy faces significant, yet temporary, losses with respect to the 
baseline (in which no tax is put into operation). This is due to the initially strong increase of the price of 
carbon, which tends to accelerate technical change despite the inertias characterizing the renewal of 
production equipment, technologies and infrastructure. By 2032, the improvement of energy efficiency 
confirms to be highly beneficial for the economic activity, especially because it renders the economy less 
vulnerable to oil shocks. This is captured by a rapid increase in GDP (Figure A.1). 
 
Figure A.1. Economic Impact of a Climate Policy Alone using the Baseline Scenario 
Ratio of OECD GDP under climate policy to OECD GDP under baseline scenario 
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD Metropolitan Database and Imaclim-R 
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